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On the Possible Forms a Relationship
Might Take between the Moral Character
of a Teacher and the Moral Development
of a Student
RICHARD OSGUTHORPE
Boise State University
Background/Context: The claim of a relationship between a teacher’s moral character and
a student’s moral development has its roots in a rich philosophical tradition. It is a tradition that maintains that the young acquire virtue by associating with virtuous people in a
virtuous community. In this way, it is assumed virtue is acquired by example and imitation. Recently, this relationship has received increased attention from philosophers of education, who emphasize the importance of the moral character of the teacher in bringing about
the proper moral development of the student.
Purpose/Objective: This article is an examination of the various forms that a relationship
might take between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.
It brings important distinctions to bear on the assumed relationship and sheds new light on
the complexities of the relationship and its possible permutations. The purpose of this article is to better understand these complexities and suggest alternative conceptions of the relationship in question.
Research Design: The methods employed in this article are primarily philosophical and follow the analytic tradition. Analytic philosophy is primarily concerned with the analysis of
meaning, and its primary roots are found in the works of Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap,
Russell, and Moore. The success of this type of philosophical inquiry rests on an ability to
better understand the use of language. This article draws on the method of ordinary language and concept analysis, relying on the process of making distinctions and suggesting
inconsistencies in the language used to describe the relationship in question.
Conclusions/Recommendations: The analysis shows that each of the forms a relationship
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might take is seemingly quite reasonable and sensible. However, it also concludes that none
of these forms provides a definitive claim that a relationship does or does not obtain between
the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. The applications
for research suggest that scholars pay closer attention to (a) the agency of students in this
relationship, (b) the relative influence of a teacher’s unintentional moral expressions, and
(c) the role of modeling in moral education. These applications also point to an important
possible shift in the conceptualization of moral education: toward morally good teaching (for
its own sake) and away from teaching students to be morally good.

The putative relationship between the moral character of a teacher and
the moral development of a student takes on various forms in the scholarship on moral education.1 Most forms are basic in nature (claiming a
relatively direct connection between a teacher’s moral character and a
student’s moral development), while others are fairly elaborate (claiming
a more indirect connection). This article is an examination of these various forms that a relationship might take—bringing important distinctions to bear on the assumed relationship and shedding new light on the
complexities of the relationship and its possible permutations. The purpose of this article, then, is to better understand these complexities and
suggest alternative conceptions of the relationship in question.
The claim of a relationship between a teacher’s moral2 character and a
student’s moral development has its roots in a rich philosophical tradition. This tradition is founded, in part, on Meno’s oft-cited inquiry into
the nature of virtue acquisition: “Can you tell me, Socrates, whether
virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice, or if neither by teaching nor
practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?”3
It is a tradition that maintains that the young acquire virtue by associating with virtuous people in a virtuous community.4 In this way, virtues are
caught, not taught.
Analytic philosophy has primarily offered insight into this relationship
by exploring how virtue might be acquired in some “other way.” Of particular relevance to this article is the work of Gilbert Ryle, who follows the
Aristotelian notion that the young acquire virtue by associating with virtuous people (those of good moral character). His work shows the evolution of the claim that a relationship obtains between the moral character
of a teacher and the moral development of a student: (a) virtue is not
acquired by teaching, at least not in the traditional sense; (b) virtue is
only partly acquired by practice; (c) virtue is not acquired solely by
nature; (d) thus virtue is acquired by a “distinct type of learning” and a
“familiar sense of teaching.” In other words, virtue is acquired by example; the greatest influence on the moral development of a child is the
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example of moral character set by an adult. Having eliminated the alternatives, Ryle grounds his assertion in an appeal to intuition, assuming
that “we all know the answer to it [Can virtue be taught?] perfectly well.”5
It is this assumption that is ubiquitous in the literature on moral education and moral development.
More recently, this relationship has received increased attention from
philosophers of education.6 For example, Fenstermacher believes that
teaching is inherently a moral activity, and as such, teachers influence the
moral development of students:
The morality of the teacher may have a considerable
impact on the morality of the student. The teacher is a
model for the students, such that the particular and concrete meaning of such traits as honesty, fair play, consideration of others, tolerance, and sharing are “picked
up,” as it were, by observing, imitating, and discussing
what teachers do in classrooms.7
He goes on to argue that everything a teacher does in the classroom
“carries with it the moral character of the teacher” and has a profound
impact on the moral development of students.8 This notion of teaching
as a moral activity is argued from different perspectives, but each perspective emphasizes the importance of the moral character of the teacher
in bringing about the proper moral development of the student.
The main argument of this article, then, is that the relationship
between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of
a student is far more ambiguous and troubled than much of the extant
literature assumes. My task is to unveil the complexities of the possible
forms a relationship might take, showing that each of the possible forms
is seemingly reasonable and sensible but that none of them is necessarily
definitive. This article takes on a claim that is intuitively appealing.
However, it is also a claim that is fraught with ambiguity, rarely questioned in the literature, and quite easily accepted.9 The benefits of the
analysis reside in the possibility that the relationship will be put in greater
relief by asking prior questions and that these questions will have important applications for future research and practice.
The article is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine
some possible forms of the relationship between the moral character of
a teacher and the moral development of a student. The purpose of this
first section is to better understand the relationship itself and its permutations. In the second section, I explore the applications of this analysis
for the study of teaching and learning. The purpose of this second
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section is to re-examine some of the extant scholarship in moral education and moral development and discuss possible directions for future
empirical research and conceptual inquiry.
THREE FORMS
Etymologically, character derives its meaning from the Greek term for
“engraved” and means an enduring mark or lasting impression (concerning what is distinct about a person in a moral sense). Thus, when we use
trait language to speak of a person’s moral character, we typically refer to
a set of distinct virtues that are “engraved” or possessed by that person.
Similarly, when we use trait language to speak of a person’s moral development, we refer to certain virtues that were “acquired” through some
process. It is not clear (in the research literature or otherwise) whether
moral character is something “engraved” or something subject to constant change, nor is it clear whether moral development entails actual
acquisition of certain traits or dispositions; notwithstanding, the possible
forms of a relationship that are presented in this section rest on or build
off of these commonly held assumptions. The first form posits a direct,
relatively basic relationship between the moral character of a teacher and
the moral development of a student. The second form explores certain
intervening variables that might indicate an indirect, more elaborate
relationship. And the third form examines the possibility that there is little or no relationship at all—that the relationship is nonexistent.
FORM ONE: A BASIC RELATIONSHIP
The first form of the relationship put forward in this article is that of a
close connection between the moral character of the teacher and the
moral development of the student. Put another way, what is “engraved”
on or possessed by the teacher is directly connected to what is “acquired”
by the student, such that the teacher’s character traits “rub off” on—or
are “picked up” by—the student. It is a direct effect in that the relationship is almost causal in nature; who the student becomes (morally) stems
immediately from who the teacher is (morally). There are certainly other
intervening—and likely stronger—forces or elements outside the classroom that contribute to the moral development of the student, but there
is still a direct connection between teacher and student as it pertains to
what is engraved and what is acquired. Thus, a caring teacher begets caring students, and so on.
Of course, the moral character that is engraved on the teacher must
also be conveyed in some manner in order for the students to pick it up.
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However, in this first form, this intervening factor does not interrupt the
connection between the source (teacher) and the recipient (student).
Instead, what is “conveyed” by the teacher is merely an exact extension of
what is engraved on the teacher. For example, the teacher who conveys
responsibility to her students by always having student papers graded on
time or who conveys kindness to her students by doing little things to
help them succeed is merely conveying his or her engraved moral character.
What is engraved can be conveyed via either expression or expectation.
When we say that a teacher conveys character to her students, we are suggesting that she either expresses or expects some trait of character. The
expression of character can be done in a variety of very specific ways: conveying respect by dressing appropriately and professionally; showing
kindness by greeting students at the door; exhibiting justice by grading
with fairness and equality; displaying care by spending personal time with
students, and so on. These expressions are not necessarily offered up as
specific examples or models for students to follow, but they convey the
character that is engraved on the teacher—making what is engraved on
the teacher apparent to the student. In other words, showing kindness by
greeting students at the door is offered up as a model for kindness and
not necessarily as a model for greeting another person at the door. Thus,
there is an important assumption here that the teacher models engraved
traits of character and that it is to these engraved traits that students
attend (and from which they generalize to their own behavior).
The expectation of moral character is similar to, but nonetheless distinct from, the expression of moral character, and it also occurs in a variety of ways: conveying honesty by requiring students to do their own
work; conveying responsibility by requiring students to be punctual; conveying compassion and friendliness by constructing and maintaining a
caring classroom community; conveying generosity by asking students to
participate in service activities, and so on. In these ways, the students
come to understand not only that the teacher values certain rules, for
example, but also that the teacher abides by these regulations himself.
This follows from the old adage that we cannot expect more from others
than we expect from ourselves.
It is in this direct way that we see the relationship between the moral
character of a teacher and the moral development of a student often conveyed in the moral education and moral development literature.
Whether by expression or expectation, it is argued that teachers convey
moral character and that it has a direct effect on the moral development
of their students—rubbing off on them or being picked up by them.10
Noddings, for example, believes that “children who are properly cared
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for by people who genuinely model social and ethical virtues are likely to
develop those virtues themselves.”11 According to Noddings, these virtues
or character traits are acquired by students via caring relations. She
explains that “caring relations come first, and it is thought that the
virtues develop almost naturally out of these relations.”12 In this way, a
direct relationship between the moral character of the teacher and the
moral development of the student is formed: whatever the teacher
expresses is subsequently picked up by the student, with no intervening
variables, forces, or outside influences. Again, there are other, perhaps
more powerful, influences than those of the teacher, but a direct relationship is also believed to obtain in classrooms as described by Noddings.
This first form describes the most basic possible relationship between the
moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.
FORM TWO: AN ELABORATE RELATIONSHIP
The second form of the relationship places emphasis on the role of the
student and the possible compromising elements that intervene between
what is engraved on the teacher and what is acquired by the student.
Recall that the first form of the relationship assumes an almost unconscious acquisition by a student whereby the student is seemingly a passive
recipient in the process of moral development. However, in the second
form, we not only account for an “interpretation” on the part of the student, but we also acknowledge that what is conveyed by the teacher might
be different from what is actually engraved. In this second form, the student switches from passive recipient to active participant in the process
of moral development.
This second form suggests an elaborate relationship that accounts for
discrepancies between what is engraved (on the teacher), what is conveyed (by the teacher), what is interpreted (by the student), and what is
acquired (by the student). The interaction between teacher and student
weaves a complex web of intention, expression, and interpretation that
may or may not result in a relationship obtaining between one’s moral
character and the other’s moral development. The relationship in this
second form is elaborate—suggesting a complexity not portrayed in the
basic form of the relationship and pointing to possible pitfalls in establishing a connection between who a teacher is and who a student
becomes in a moral sense.
Thus, in this second form, there is an indirect relationship between what
is engraved on the teacher and what is acquired by the student; there are
intervening variables that influence what is ultimately acquired by the
student. These variables include (a) what is conveyed by the teacher and
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(b) what is interpreted by the student; they represent an exchange of
communication between teacher and student that is susceptible to multiple levels of misrepresentation and misunderstanding. The field of social
psychology, particularly the work of Erving Goffman, is instructive here
in illuminating how this relationship may not involve a direct connection,
and this section of the analysis closely follows Goffman’s theories of social
interaction ritual.
The first intervening variable focuses on what is conveyed by the
teacher. These expressions can be conscious or unconscious and provide
students with information that will lead them to ascribe certain traits and
dispositions to the teacher. Recall that in the first form of the relationship, these expressions or expectations did not deviate from what is
engraved on the teacher. This second form, however, acknowledges the
possibility that what is conveyed might be different from what is
engraved. As Goffman puts it, “Face-to-face situations are, in fact, ideal
projective fields that the participant cannot help but structure in a characterizing way so that conclusions can be drawn about him, correct or
incorrect, whether he wants it or not.”13 These ascriptions are unavoidable in the daily face-to-face interaction between teacher and student.
More important, a teacher can both consciously and unconsciously make
this type of information available to students.
What is consciously conveyed by a teacher is a manifestation of the
moral role or persona that a teacher adopts in the classroom. However, a
teacher’s moral persona is not necessarily what is engraved on the
teacher. Goffman suggests that it is not uncommon to consciously express
moral traits and dispositions in a way that differs from what is actually
engraved: “When the individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially credited
values of society, more so, in fact, than does his behavior as a whole.”14
Thus, the moral role or persona that a teacher inhabits has two separate
functions: it represents the teacher’s idealized moral view, and it also
serves as a mask that conceals what is actually engraved. When a teacher
assumes a moral persona, he effectively hides traits and dispositions that
run counter to his required performance. It is also possible that a
teacher, as a complex human being, displays moral traits and dispositions
in ways that differ from one context to another. The point here is that in
teaching, as in other professions (or human interactions for that matter),
what you see is not necessarily what is there—what is consciously conveyed by the teacher is not necessarily what is engraved on the teacher.
The second intervening variable in this form of the relationship concerns what is interpreted by the student. If what is consciously conveyed
by the teacher represents an “ideal” morality, then what is unconsciously
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conveyed by the teacher hints at a “real” morality (or what is actually
engraved on the teacher). Because the student recognizes that the
teacher adopts a moral persona or portrays an idealized view in the classroom, a student separates a teacher’s conscious expression and unconscious expression in an effort to discover what lies underneath the mask.
Goffman distinguishes these expressions as what a person “gives” (conscious expression) and what a person “gives off” (unconscious expression).15 It is through these unconscious expressions that a student can see
past the moral persona of the teacher and discriminate what is consciously conveyed from what is engraved.
However, the process of ascertaining what is conscious expression from
unconscious expression—and ascribing meaning to these unconscious
expressions—involves a complex game of information exchange between
teacher and student that may or may not have a conclusion. It is a complex game because the possibility always exists that the teacher’s unconscious expression may only appear to be unconscious. In other words, the
teacher can take advantage of this seeming asymmetry and influence
what is interpreted by the student (creating symmetry, once again, in the
exchange). Goffman contends that this type of exchange is potentially
never-ending in its number of iterations16 and goes on to say in another
work that this exchange becomes one of strategy and “counter-uncovering moves” by those involved in the interaction.17 This back and forth
between subject and observer (or teacher and student) reveals the complex nature of the communication process involved in interpreting what
is engraved via what is conveyed.
Furthermore, although this type of information game may never end
(and the conclusions drawn about others’ morality may not be conclusions at all), it is important to note that the observer (the student) ultimately has the upper hand, having access to one additional “stream” of
communication; it is more difficult for the teacher to “cover” than it is for
the student to “uncover.” In Goffman’s terms, asymmetry prevails.18 In
this way, the aspect of the communication process that is most vital to this
information game is the unconscious, unguided, involuntary aspect of
the subject’s (teacher’s) behavior. The student uses this aspect to determine what is “real,” and the teacher uses it to control the student’s interpretation by attempting to make certain expressions appear unconscious.
This description of the information game between teacher and student
assumes that there is a clear distinction between a teacher’s conscious
and unconscious expressions of morality (and that a student has some
capacity to make such a distinction), but the game is made even more
complex by the possibility that a teacher’s expressions of morality are displayed differently based on situation and context. In the end, determin-
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ing unconscious expressions of morality from conscious ones is dependent on a variety of variables that renders the distinction tenuous at best,
which results in an increasingly intricate and elaborate exchange
between teacher and student.
If the unconscious aspect of the teacher’s behavior is the most important aspect of this information exchange, then the most troubling aspect
is that it often relies on relatively minor signs or cues. In search of the
teacher’s unconscious expressions of morality, the student depends
increasingly on what might appear to be a teacher’s seemingly insignificant expressions. As Goffman describes it, this tendency is potentially
hazardous to the communication process, as these seemingly insignificant expressions are susceptible to misinterpretation and can disrupt
“the tone of an entire performance.”19 Thus, what is interpreted or ascertained by the student is constantly in flux as information or “signs” of
moral character are constantly being conveyed and exchanged by the
teacher, resulting in an indirect and elaborate relationship between the
moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.
FORM THREE: A NONEXISTENT RELATIONSHIP
This third form of the relationship suggests the possibility that there is no
relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student. In other words, what is acquired by the student
has little, if anything, to do with what is engraved on the teacher (nor,
perhaps, with what is conveyed by the teacher). In this third form, the
moral development of students is not influenced in any important way by
the moral character of teachers; a teacher may still have some effect on
the moral development of a student via methods of moral instruction
and other means, but that effect is simply not connected to a teacher’s
moral character in this form of the relationship. For example, a teacher
may exhort students to be honest by discussing it as “the moral of the
story” when reading a book, and students in turn may acquire the trait of
honesty, but the acquisition of the trait is not dependent on the teacher
being an honest person himself. In this form, the moral character of
the teacher is not a determining factor in the moral development of
students.
This form suggests that children will develop certain character traits
and dispositions regardless of the moral character of their teachers.
Again, their teachers may influence the acquisition of these traits via certain means of fostering moral development, but the acquisition is not
contingent on whether their teachers possess these same traits.
Understood in this way, the possibility that there is no relationship
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between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of
a student does not seem so conspicuous. While this form of the relationship appears to contradict our intuitive sense of how certain kinds of
moral development occur, it also appeals to our common sense that the
moral character of teachers might have nothing to do with the moral
development of students.
The basis for this form of the relationship is the lack of empirical evidence that establishes a relationship. Although the relationship has certain intuitive appeal, it is a largely assumed proposition20 that is not
grounded in any empirically convincing evidence.21 As Halstead and
Taylor suggest in their review of research, “Since values are inherent in
teaching, it seems unlikely that students will be able to avoid the influence of teachers’ values completely. . . . However, research provides
mixed evidence about the extent to which children follow the example
of their teachers, or even respect them.22 The mixed evidence that they
cite is primarily focused on claims that the moral development that
occurs in classroom takes place, for the most part, without teacher or student being aware of it. The only evidence of a direct and strong connection is the relationship that may obtain between the moral character of a
parent and the moral development of a child. Parent-child studies have
hinted at some connection, but the evidence is still not clear.23 Moreover,
there is no evidence that the teacher-student relationship is a proxy for
the parent-child relationship in terms of moral development, and there
are simply too many factors that influence moral development to assume
that the relationship obtains in schools.
While it is clear that this form of the relationship is questionable on
empirical grounds, there might also be theoretical grounds for doubting
it. The literature on imitation and modeling, specifically the work of
Bandura, suggests that certain “subprocesses” (especially attentional and
motivational, in this case) influence a learner’s acquisition of modeled
behavior. Thus it is certainly possible that factors or conditions related to
these subprocesses—such as the level of student identification with the
model or the level of student motivation—might not obtain in schools
between teacher and student.24 A theoretical elaboration is needed to
confirm this possibility, but the possibility is enough to suggest that the
relationship might be nonexistent.
Thus, in this form of the relationship, if we are to judge from the
empirical evidence (and perhaps the theoretical evidence), there is little
or no relationship between the moral character of the teacher and the
moral development of students. Good moral character on the part of the
teacher is desirable, but it is not known what effect, if any, it might have
on the moral development of students. If teachers do have an impact on
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the moral development of students, this form of the relationship holds
that such an influence is attributable to other factors (and not the moral
character of the teacher). A teacher might be able to “teach” virtue, but
a student does not merely “pick up” virtue by being around a teacher.
There is simply no evidence that such a relationship obtains in schools.
SUMMARY
In the preceding analysis, I argued that the relationship between the
moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student
takes on multiple forms. These possible forms highlight some of the
ambiguities and inconsistencies in the relationship. The first form maintains a basic, almost causal, relationship between the moral character of
the teacher and the moral development of the student. Who the student
becomes (morally) is directly connected to who the teacher is (morally).
What is engraved on the teacher is subsequently acquired by the student—what is engraved on the teacher “rubs off” on or is “picked-up” by
the student.
The second form establishes a much more elaborate relationship
between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of
a student. Who the student becomes (morally) is only indirectly connected to who the teacher is (morally). There are intervening factors in
the relationship that influence what is acquired by the student: what is
engraved on a teacher is not necessarily what is conveyed by the teacher,
and both may be different than what is interpreted by the student and
what is ultimately acquired. The relationship itself is subject to a complex
“information game” between teacher and student that contributes to its
elaborate nature.
The third form dispels the notion of any relationship between the
moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student.
Who a teacher is (morally) has no necessary effect on who a student
becomes (morally). Students will develop certain character traits and dispositions regardless of the moral character of their teachers, and while
teachers may influence the acquisition of these traits via certain means of
fostering moral development, the acquisition is in no way contingent on
whether the teachers possess these traits. What is engraved (morally) on
a teacher may or may not be connected to what is taught (morally).
These forms describe the possibility of a basic, elaborate, or nonexistent relationship, suggesting that the relationship itself is indeterminate
at best. Thus, while this analysis has shown that each of these forms a
relationship might take is seemingly quite reasonable and sensible, it has
also shown that none of these forms provides a definitive claim that a
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relationship does or does not obtain between the moral character of a
teacher and the moral development of a student. Future research on
moral education must take account of these ambiguities and inconsistencies if it is to deal adequately with the complexity of the issues.
APPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF TEACHING AND LEARNING
To apply the analysis in this article to the study of teaching and learning,
I re-examine extant scholarship that represents three different types of
scholarly inquiry. The first of these comes from the domain of educational research, another from the domain of educational theory, and the
last from the domain of educational practice. From a research perspective, I consider Philip Jackson, Robert Boostrom, and David Hansen’s
ethnographic study, The Moral Life of Schools. From a theoretical perspective, I explore Nel Noddings’s philosophical analysis of moral education
based on an ethic of care. And, from a practical perspective, I examine
Kevin Ryan and Karen Bohlin’s argument for character education programs and curriculum.
While these scholars certainly do not represent all the work undertaken from their respective perspectives, they are all recognized as exemplary contributors of scholarly work on the moral dimensions of teaching, moral development, and moral education. My selection of
scholarship in each of these categories is based on the degree to which I
think the particular work illuminates important issues that pertain to the
relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student, and points to applications that this article
might have for the study of moral education and moral development. To
discuss these applications, I begin with the scholarly inquiry of Jackson,
Boostrom, and Hansen, followed by Noddings, and then Ryan and
Bohlin. In each section, I describe the assertions of the relationship
between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of
a student, and then I examine the grounds for these assertions and their
strength in relation to the analysis provided in the previous section of this
article.
A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE: JACKSON, BOOSTROM, AND HANSEN
The applications of this analysis to research on moral education and
moral development focus primarily on the attention (or relative inattention) given to students. Claims of a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student often emphasize the moral impact of a teacher (what is engraved and what is
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conveyed) without systematically studying students (what is interpreted
and what is acquired). In other words, much of the research that assumes
a relationship focuses primarily on the moral character of a teacher, without corresponding consideration to the moral development of students.25
These studies explore the ways that teachers express and model moral
character and then assume, perhaps intuitively, that it has an influence
on the moral development of students.
For example, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen, in their ethnographic
study of moral life in schools, contend that the ever-present morality in
classroom practice has an effect on the moral development of students.
They set out to “investigate the ways in which moral considerations permeate the everyday life of schools and classrooms.”26 They looked at all
aspects of schools and classrooms and identified eight categories of
moral influence—five “intentional” and three “unintentional.”27 The
intentional categories are “deliberate attempts to promote moral instruction and to encourage moral behavior,” while the unintentional categories “consist of activities that embody the moral.” Again, of particular
interest to the inquiry in this article are the unintentional ways that teachers foster moral development, specifically the category that Jackson,
Boostrom, and Hansen label “expressive morality within the classroom.”28
This category includes “almost everything a teacher says and does,” such
as standing at the door of the classroom and welcoming each student—
expressing a sense of care and kindness.
Instead of moral curriculum and instruction, these unintentional categories rely primarily on the “personal qualities of teachers that—sometimes unintentionally—embody a moral outlook or stance.” These personal qualities are made visible to students in what Jackson, Boostrom,
and Hansen describe as “vaporlike emanations of character.” And they
argue, citing Emerson, that “we pass for what we are. Character teaches
above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice
only by their overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath
every moment.” As grounds for this assertion, they cite their extended
observations and study of classrooms. They also admit that it is difficult
to see an expression of character and that any attempt to describe it to
others is even more arduous because these expressions are always embedded in the teacher and in the classroom experience. Thus, they argue
that “to appreciate fully the basis of that judgment one would have to
have been there.”29
In terms of moral influence in the classroom, these researchers maintain that these personal qualities of teachers are consequently picked up
by students via, for example, “expressive morality in the classroom.” In
other words, teachers give off these “vapor like emanations of character,”
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which are in turn observed by students and assumedly incorporated.
Thus, as they put it, these unintentional categories “help us to see how
morals might be ‘caught, not taught’ as the old adage says.”30 The basis
for this argument, despite its reliance on an old adage, is not explicitly
clear. While it can be assumed that students observed these expressions
in much the same way that the researchers did, how exactly students
“catch” these expressions and incorporate them is not revealed in their
study.
While they do not offer evidence for students picking up the virtues,
they do assert that this set of unintentional categories—including expressions of morality—has the greatest moral impact on students. They argue
that these categories are of more consequence than deliberate attempts
at moral instruction because their influence is always present in the classroom:
We believe that the unintentional outcomes of schooling, the
ones teachers and administrators seldom plan in advance, are of
greater moral significance—that is, more likely to have enduring
effects—than those that are intended and consciously sought. . .
. One of our chief reasons for doing so, which should be fairly
clear by now, is that many of the unintended influences are in
operation all or most of the time, whereas the intended ones are
more episodic and self-contained.31
Put another way, a teacher’s moral character is more influential in
terms of a student’s moral development because a teacher’s moral character is always visible.
To summarize, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen make the following
assertions: (a) personal qualities of teachers embody and express a moral
position; (b) students pick up or “catch” these qualities by being around
teachers for a sustained period of time; and (c) emanations of personal
character traits have much greater influence than any attempt at direct
moral instruction. As grounds for the first assertion, they cite their observations in classrooms. For the second assertion, they refer to the old
adage that “morals are caught, not taught.” And for the third assertion,
they reason that a constant (or almost constant) unintended influence
has more impact than one that is direct and occasional.
These assertions, particularly the grounds on which they are made,
appeal to our intuitive sense of how moral development occurs in the
young. However, it is difficult to determine the strength of these claims
(in relation to the evidence provided) because of the ambiguities and
complexities associated with the relationship in question. The first asser-
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tion that they make—that teachers unintentionally express moral messages to their students—is certainly their strongest. In fact, Jackson,
Boostrom, and Hansen convincingly describe a variety of ways that this
takes place in a classroom setting, and they base these descriptions on
three years’ worth of observations, interviews, and analyses of individual
schools. That said, even the researchers admit that a complete understanding of this claim would require a person to observe alongside them
in the same classroom. This admission suggests the complexity involved
in the moral information game between teacher and student, and it
points out that picking up on moral cues in the classroom requires astute
observation on the part of the student. In other words, “what is interpreted” by a student (or, in this case, an observer) may be different than
“what is conveyed” by a teacher, and it may also differ from student to student in the same classroom.
Furthermore, to also assume that these expressions of morality have an
impact on the moral development of students (their second assertion)
would likely require more than observation and would certainly entail a
systematic study of students. While Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen
might correctly assume that students in their study noticed their teachers’ expressions of morality (though probably not to the extent that the
researchers did), this article has shown that it cannot be assumed that the
students properly interpreted and then consequently “caught” or
acquired the expressed traits. Of course, even if the evidence and intuitive grounds for their claims are questionable, it is unreasonable to criticize them because it is certainly not clear what would constitute such evidence (and because their study focused primarily on the morality
conveyed by a teacher). Presumably, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen are
purposefully vague in their descriptions of students’ moral development
because of its complexity and the difficulty of controlling for all the possible variables that might influence it.
For example, in ancillary work from the same study, Hansen is very
careful to point out that a teacher’s moral influence on students is, at
best, only possible and perhaps indeterminate “in any direct or easily
measurable sense.”32 He also contends that observing a teacher’s moral
behavior does “not imply that the students are learning moral dispositions directly from their teachers. [However], students’ awareness of the
subtleties of many of their teachers’ habitual actions may in itself make it
possible for those actions to have influence on them.”33 Jackson, Boostrom,
and Hansen do not hedge their findings in this way, but it can be inferred
that they recognized this difficulty in their study.
The third claim—that the unintentional ways of fostering moral development are the most influential—is the most basic of the three assertions
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but may also be the most problematic. Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen
describe in detail the moral life of the schools that participated in their
study, but they do not attempt to measure the effects or consequences
that this “moral life” has on students. Their assertion is based on the
assumption that influence is correlated to how often the intentional or
unintentional ways are in operation or employed in classroom.
However, while the unintended influences may be “in operation all or
most of the time,”34 it seems reasonable to suggest that other more intentional ways of fostering moral development (such as interjecting moral
commentary into a class discussion) may have just as much influence on
the moral development of students as expressing morality in the classroom (an unintentional way). For example, a teacher who repeatedly
comments on the importance of achieving social justice may perhaps
have as much of a moral impact as a teacher who expresses care for students by greeting them each day as they walk in the door. Determining
which teacher in this example has more influence on moral development
is not important. The question is, “How would we know?” And in this
case, it becomes evident that deciding which activity is more influential
does not appear to be a question that can be answered without more
focused attention on students and a research design that accounts for the
complexity of moral development.
In conclusion, Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen rightly assert that these
ways of fostering moral development—both intentional and unintentional—have the potential to have an impact on the moral development
of students. However, to make claims of particular influence (or that
some ways are more influential than others) would likely require a more
systematic study of students that mirrored their detailed and insightful
analysis of teachers. While their study certainly attended to the students
in these classrooms,35 their primary focus appeared to be teachers. This
critique is not meant to discount the situational and qualitative nature of
their ethnographic approach. It merely suggests, as this article has
shown, that specific attention to students would be necessary to establish
a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student.
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: NODDINGS
The applications of this analysis for theories of moral education and
moral development focus primarily on the purportedly unintentional,
unselfconscious, and/or indirect ways that teachers foster the moral development of their students. Similar to empirical claims that a teacher’s
influence is most powerful when unintended (see the above description
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of Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen), it is commonly asserted in theory
that a teacher’s moral character has the most impact when unconscious
or indirectly manifested. In other words, it is believed that a strong relationship obtains between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student when a teacher conveys morality unconsciously,
unintentionally, or indirectly.
For example, recall that Noddings advocates an approach to moral
education based on an ethic of care and on four major components of
moral education: modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation.36 She
is careful to distinguish her approach from character education programs in that her approach is relational, based on a “caring relation” and
involving both a “carer” (or “one-caring”) and a “cared-for.” And these
relational terms are integral to her conception of how moral development and moral education occur. Noddings emphasizes that a caring
relation involves two people:
A caring relation is, in its most basic form, a connection or
encounter between two human beings—a carer and a recipient
of care, or cared-for. In order for the relation to be properly
called caring, both parties must contribute to it in characteristic
ways. A failure on the part of either carer or cared-for blocks
completion of caring and, although there may still be a relation—that is, an encounter or connection in which each party
feels something toward the other—it is not a caring relation.37
Noddings argues that the carer (or one-caring) is characterized by
“engrossment” and “motivational displacement.”38 In other words, the
carer is fully “attentive” and receptive to the cared-for and also “feels the
desire to help the stranger in his need.”39
However, this way of being has no impact on the cared-for unless it is
“received.” Thus, Noddings contends that the cared-for is characterized
by “reception,” “recognition,” and “response.” In other words, “the caredfor receives the caring and shows that it has been received.”40 Based on
this notion of a caring relation, derived from an ethic of care, Noddings
asserts a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the
moral development of a student.
Thus, the relationship that obtains between the moral character of a
teacher and the moral development of a student in Noddings’s work rests
firmly on the concept of modeling. Noddings believes that “children who
are properly cared for by people who genuinely model social and ethical
virtues are likely to develop those virtues themselves.”41 These virtues
are developed in students via caring relations. Noddings explains that
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“caring relations come first, and it is thought that the virtues develop
almost naturally out of these relations.”42
As grounds for this assertion, Noddings draws on an ethic of care. She
describes how “a sense that ‘I must’ do something arises when others
address us.” Sometimes this “I must” arises out of a natural disposition,
such as love for a sibling. When the inclination is not there, we fall back
on what Noddings describes as “ethical caring,” in which we “draw upon
an ethical ideal—a set of memories of caring and being cared for that we
regard as manifestations of our best selves and relations.”43 In both
instances, the role of the carer is of particular importance, and an ethic
of care gives preference to natural caring. For example, Noddings also
asserts that modeling a caring relation (the first component of moral
education) should not be a self-conscious act. She states that “we present
the best possible model when we care unselfconsciously, as a way of being
in the world.”44 She warns that self-conscious or intentional caring results
in a shift of attention away from the cared-for. In such instances, the carer
actually moves away from caring.
To summarize, Noddings makes at least three assertions that pertain to
the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student: (a) children develop a caring disposition by
being around people who model caring dispositions; (b) the caring relation is the most important component of developing virtue in the
young—when the caring relation is in place, virtues develop naturally;
and (c) the best, most effective model of caring is one that is not self-conscious or intentional. As grounds for the first two assertions, she relies on
an ethic of care, which holds that we have a natural disposition to care
when others address us in need. This disposition is developed by being
cared for and by observing one caring (in this instance, a teacher). The
third assertion is also grounded in an ethic of care and the contention
that intentional or self-conscious caring tends to move the carer away
from anything we might call caring.
Given her philosophical orientation, it would be unfair to determine
the strength of Noddings’s claims on anything other than clarity of concept, and certainly, care theory has proved to be robust and one of the
most important contributions to the field of moral education in recent
years. That said, her assertions also highlight important applications of
the analysis in this article for future research and practice in the field. For
example, the task that might present the most difficulty in future
research is determining how the unselfconscious model of caring has
more influence than the self-conscious model. Again, Noddings contends
that intentional and conscious caring removes the carer from the caring
relation; caring is only caring if done unselfconsciously.
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However, given the analysis in this article, it is not apparent why the
unselfconscious or unintentional display of caring or morality is more
influential. As Goffman makes clear, there is great nuance involved in the
information game that takes place between two persons, and the actor
(or teacher) is always capable of “controlling the control.” Put another
way, it certainly seems possible for the carer to control the control and
“give off” unselfconscious caring to the cared-for. Moreover, Noddings,
like Goffman, assumes that asymmetry always prevails in the caring relation—that the cared-for can uncover the intentions of the carer despite
any attempt by the carer to “control the control.” This claim has merit in
Goffman’s studies of adult interaction rituals, but it is certainly not evident in cases of teacher-student interaction—particularly in the early
grades. In other words, a young student’s capacity to employ “uncovering
moves” seems less developed than an experienced teacher’s capacity to
employ “counter-uncovering moves” in the information game (or caring
relation) that takes place between the two in a classroom setting.
In the end, it may be that what sounds good conceptually may be difficult to examine and demonstrate in research and practice. Thus, further
investigation and delineation of the unselfconscious, unintentional, indirect ways that a teacher fosters moral development becomes an important application of this article for the philosophical study of the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student.
A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE: RYAN AND BOHLIN
The applications of the analysis in this article for the practical study of
moral education and moral development focus on claims that rely, perhaps too heavily, on modeling. Recall that Ryan and Bohlin are strong
advocates for character education. They emphasize direct instruction
and the inculcation of core virtues. They contend that there are commonly agreed-upon virtues such as respect, responsibility, and integrity
and that teachers should promote them in their classrooms via a variety
of methods. They also place great emphasis on the role that the
teacher/adult plays in the process of moral development. They argue
that good character is developed by knowing the good, loving the good,
and doing the good, requiring support and help from adult/teacher
examples. They state that “becoming a . . . person of character is a
developmental process. It takes knowledge. It takes practice. It takes support, example (both good and bad), encouragement, and sometimes
inspiration.”45
Despite an obvious fondness for direct instruction in the virtues, Ryan
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and Bohlin hold that a teacher’s example is the most influential means
of moral education. They like to say that virtues are caught and taught.
For instance, Ryan and Bohlin list six Es that “can help educators remember how to promote moral development within each student.”46 The first
E stands for Example.47 They argue that students judge their teachers’
character and that “ultimately, it is the person, not the teacher, who makes
a lasting impression on his or her students. . . . The examples provided
by parents, teachers, and all the adults who are closest to children are the
most powerful moral educators.”48 As grounds for this claim, they cite
Robert Coles, who states, “The child is an ever-attentive witness of grownup morality—or lack thereof; the child looks and looks for cues as to how
one ought to behave, and finds them galore as we as teachers and parents
go about our lives.”49 They also list generic examples of teachers who left
just such an impression, such as the teacher who consoled a student in a
moment of sadness. This lasting impression is a moral one—an indelible
mark on the student that contributes to moral development.
Ryan and Bohlin go on to explain that direct instruction does not leave
an impression unless the teacher is an example of those virtues in deed
as well as in word. In other words, they assert that for teachers to effectively engage in the direct instruction of virtue, their moral character
must be expressive of those desired traits and dispositions. Ryan and
Bohlin argue that students do not “believe” the moral instruction offered
by teachers unless they “see” it in their actions. Playing off an old adage,
they ground this assertion by stating that “individual actions speak louder
than words; it’s our deeds that really give witness to what’s most worthwhile. These are what compose our most powerful lessons in character.”50
A final assertion that Ryan and Bohlin make concerning the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student is that one’s true character is always revealed, despite
any attempt one might make at disguising it. They state that “when we
spend time with people, their integrity and character are revealed to us,
and often these are quite contrary to what they would like us to think.”
And they argue, citing St. Exupery’s Little Prince, that “what is essential is
often invisible to the eye, but it eventually becomes evident to the
heart.”51 In other words, we can see right through people and false
appearances—unearthing their true character.
Thus, Ryan and Bohlin make three claims about modeling that pertain
to the relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the
moral development of a student: (a) “It is the person, not the teacher,
who makes a lasting impression on students. . . . [E]xamples . . . are the
most powerful moral educators”52; (b) direct instruction is only effective
if a teacher practices what he or she preaches; and (c) one’s true charac-
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ter is always revealed, despite any attempt one might make at disguising
it. As grounds for the first assertion, Ryan and Bohlin cite Robert Coles,
who argues that children look to adults for moral cues. For the second
assertion, they rely on the old adage that says, “seeing is believing.” And
for the third assertion, they cite St. Exupery and argue that when we
spend time with people, we tend to unearth their integrity and character—what is essential becomes visible.
The analysis in this article details certain complexities that make it difficult to determine the strength of Ryan and Bohlin’s claims. For example, their assertion that students do not believe the moral instruction
offered by teachers unless they see it in the teacher’s actions relies on a
time-honored adage (“seeing is believing”), but it may or may not be relevant to the impact that the moral character of teachers has on the moral
development of students. The analysis in this article suggests that it is not
clear how good a teacher needs to be in order to convey good moral character, and it also raises the possibility that a teacher of poor moral character could foster the moral development of children in good, healthy,
and positive ways. In other words, is it possible that a teacher could disguise destructive character traits and dispositions, and at the same time
express traits in the classroom that students could emulate? Or, as Ryan
and Bohlin (along with Robert Coles) contend, would students see right
through this charade?
We can already answer these questions at some basic level without
engaging in some type of research project or examination of practice. As
the analysis in this article attests, it is not difficult to picture a teacher who
says one thing in a classroom but does another. It is also easy to imagine
that many teachers possess unhealthy character traits that they would
rather not bring with them into the classroom. Moreover, it is also easy to
conceive of teachers who could conceal these undesirable traits from students. In other words, it seems somewhat implausible to expect students
to “see right through” teachers and be able to identify teachers’ less than
admirable dispositions. Even accepting that children only, as Ryan and
Bohlin put it, “believe what they see,” it seems possible that teachers
would be able to disguise a vice and act in a way that makes students
believe that they possess the corresponding virtue instead.
Most important, this action or expression on the part of the teacher
does not necessarily need to be deceptive; as Goffman suggests, we all
portray an idealized moral view of ourselves, especially in professions
(such as teaching) that require a certain pose. Instead, it can be an act of
good faith on the teacher’s part, with the hope that her students might
“pick up” these desirable traits. In the end, the analysis in this article has
shown that it is difficult to determine just how good a teacher needs to
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be, and Ryan and Bohlin’s claim that students only pick up traits that
teachers embody would, again, require supporting evidence that
accounts for the complexities of moral development and controls for the
possible intervening variables. Thus, the final application of this article
for the practice of moral education and moral development is that there
might be an overreliance on the concept and practice of modeling.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has suggested three possible forms that a relationship might
take between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Given these three quite reasonable and possible
forms—basic, elaborate, and nonexistent—the relationship itself is indeterminate at best because none of the forms is necessarily definitive.
What implications might a claim of indeterminacy have for the field of
moral education and moral development? Is the moral character of a
teacher not relevant to an understanding of the development of moral
and intellectual virtue in students? In light of the centuries of philosophical work on moral education and moral development, it would be
imprudent to answer the preceding question in the affirmative. Surely
the expression of moral character is integral to explaining how virtue is
or is not acquired in the young—even when empirical evidence is
brought to bear. That such an explanation or claim is so pervasive in the
historical and philosophical literature on moral education speaks to the
intuitive desire of people to acknowledge the moral models who shaped
their moral development.
In an effort to further examine claims of a relationship, this article
examines the extant literature and suggests three important applications
for the study of teaching and learning. First, it recommends that more
specific attention to students would be necessary to establish a relationship between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Second, it signals a need for increased conceptual
analysis of the unselfconscious, unintentional, and indirect ways that a
teacher fosters moral development. Finally, it proposes that there might
be an overreliance on the concept and practice of modeling moral character in character education programs and curriculum. Together, these
applications provide important future directions for empirical research,
conceptual inquiry, and practical programs that bear on determining the
efficacy or reality of the relationship between the moral character of a
teacher and the moral development of a student.
For example, a systematic study of students might reveal how students
make sense of the moral dimensions of teaching, how students interpret
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their teachers’ expressions of moral character, and how students acquire
their teachers’ traits. In terms of evidence and gathering data, each of
these tasks is progressively more difficult. Research on moral education
and moral development begs for student reports and commentaries that
would aid in understanding the complexities of the relationship in question (as well as the moral dimensions of teaching and learning writ
large), and it would be relatively simple to insert more of these voices
into the current scholarship. These student reports and commentaries
would offer corroboration to researchers’ observations, provide examples of students’ moral awareness, and detail the ways in which students
ascribe moral meaning to the role of the teacher.
However, it is less clear what might count as sufficient evidence for
determining whether students acquire their teachers’ traits of moral
character. The research scientist might be able to offer perspective on
providing evidence of a relationship, but the analysis in this article shows
that any expectation of establishing a relationship with scientific evidence
and measurement tools might not be appropriate or feasible. Thus the
analysis in this article merely suggests that further study of students is
necessary to place the relationship in greater relief (furthering our
understanding of its inherent complexities); it does not imply that such
research will be sufficient for establishing a relationship.
That said, the limitations of scientific inquiry only give rise to additional prior philosophical questions that merit reflection and further
study. These questions might include (a) why teachers should be of good
moral character, (b) how morally good teachers need to be, and (c) what
effects teachers of poor moral character might have on students. For
example, in light of the analysis in this article, it might be fruitful to
examine reasons for wanting teachers of good moral character that
extend beyond the moral development (and/or the safety) of students
and point instead to pedagogical reasons that might enhance student
learning and achievement. In addition, the analysis in this article certainly has implications for determining how morally good a teacher
needs to be and suggests that a teacher might be able to adopt a moral
persona in the classroom that is not a reflection of “engraved” moral
character (leaving open the possibility of just how good a teacher needs
to be outside the classroom). And finally, the preceding analysis considers
only good moral character. However, it might be that considering the
possible effects of poor moral character on students would place the relationship in even greater relief, because common sense likely holds that
we would want to avoid teachers of poor moral character regardless of
the possible forms that a relationship might take.
Thus, this analysis suggests that there are reasonable theoretical and
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empirical grounds for doubting that there is a relationship between the
moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student,
and it maintains that it might not be possible to determine how or
whether a relationship obtains (especially in the context of schooling). It
also acknowledges the relationship’s intuitive appeal and holds that it
would be unreasonable to dismiss claims of a relationship as unscientific;
the notion of a relationship is simply too entrenched in the way we understand the process of moral development. In the end, it might be that
virtue is acquired in some other way (besides teaching or practice), but
further study is needed to examine the complexities of our vague intuitions.
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